of what ‘we have in secular culture that could even begin to address the needs met by the Eucharist’ (p. 469). Schwartz explores the place and expression of mystery, sign-making and efficacy in the poetic expression of the Eucharistic practice of the period. Wild offers a similar exposition on the developing place of aesthetic awareness in the Eucharist of the Reformation. His work contains a specific examination of the work of eighteenth century Lutheran estheticist, Gotthold Lessing, entitled ‘Laocoön: An Essay on the limits of Painting and Poetry’.

Wandel’s volume is a valuable contribution to the corpus of knowledge concerning the development of the Eucharist in the Reformation. He brings together a collection of essays which enable scholarly access and accessible scholarship to a variety of topics pertinent to the study of the Eucharist in the Reformation.

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For all those interested in Martin Heidegger’s theologische Jugendjahre, Judith Wolfe provides an excellent entrance. In six chapters, ranging from Heidegger’s religious provenance in a scholastic and somewhat eerie antimodernist Roman Catholicism up to Being and Time (1927), Wolfe narrates Heidegger’s changing attitude toward the practice of theology as well as early responses to Heidegger’s work, whose fame was established well before the publication of his magnum opus. Wolfe’s book is well informed – she often makes use of recent published letters of Heidegger on the subject – and this reader is struck by how well it reads: at times, the book comes close to being an academic equivalent of a page-turner.

Wolfe’s basic point is that Heidegger’s phenomenology provides us with an ‘eschatology without eschaton’, an eschatology that sees in the empirical end of our lives the one and only vantage-point to conceive and understand the sense of our being. For Heidegger, indeed, there is nothing beyond finitude, yet we first and foremost fail to grasp and evade even this very fact of our being. It is only certain limit-experiences, like anxiety and boredom, that makes us face the endless finitude of things and realize that in effect ‘all things shall pass’. But Wolfe is not content with this very basic phenomenology of finitude
and promises us to give the ‘pressure-points’ (p. 4) of Heidegger’s thinking about (or around) theology. Wolfe will conclude, on the one hand, that Heidegger’s ‘de-theologized eschatology’ (p. 4) is a very strong critique of scholasticism and its all too rationalist strands, but that in Heidegger too there is still hidden a silenced ‘desire to transcend finitude’ on the other (p. 5). Notably through drawing upon Edith Stein’s sustained dialogue with Heidegger, Wolfe in her conclusion attempts to bring Heidegger again ‘in dialogue with theology’ (p. 6).

After the (very) young Heidegger’s attempt to present himself as a theologian – for a while he did go a long way with the ‘antimodern’ camp in Catholicism – two influences on Heidegger seem pivotal for Wolfe in Heidegger’s admitted ‘break with the system of Catholicism’ (1919). In these years, Heidegger’s confrontation with Dilthey and Husserl’s phenomenology as well as with the soon to become dominant strand in theology to stress a ‘primal’ Christianity not yet contaminated with dogmatic and institutional constraints (through readings of among others Luther and Albert Schweitzer) led him to increasingly embrace Protestantism. Wolfe mentions that, empirically, his broken engagement with the Catholic Gretl Weninger in 1915 (p. 56) and the later marriage with the Protestant Elfride in 1917 (p. 42) might have accelerated this process that was more or less completed in 1922 when Heidegger became Husserl’s assistant in Marburg.

This ‘protestant’ Heidegger, according to Wolfe, showed that ‘Heidegger discovered the phenomenological method together with Protestantism, in large part as a means to adequately describing religious experience’ (pp. 44, 61). It is not the case that Heidegger turned to religion to do phenomenology (as if he wanted to describe the object, ‘religion’, from the outside) but rather the other way around: he turned to phenomenology to describe his interest in religion (from an insider’s perspective seeking to describe this interest and involvement phenomenologically). Much of these years, Wolfe argues, is in effect dedicated to the development of a ‘more authentic Christian theology’: here Heidegger seems to have considered it the task of philosophy to spell out ‘the eternal destiny of man’ (pp. 46, 51).

Yet it might have been phenomenology that gradually makes Heidegger wary of theology, and Wolfe could have indicated this more clearly. Nevertheless, it is through phenomenology, and a fortiori through the stress on historicity, that Heidegger comes to believe that there is no genuine vantage-point outside the human (p. 51, also 64). At first, this insight shows itself in Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Religious Life (1920–1921) where, Wolfe believes, Heidegger ‘misreads’ (p. 65) Paul by stressing eschatological affliction rather than hope as being Paul’s basic mood. From within Protestantism, Heidegger develops his phenomenology as a philosophy that will become increasingly stripped of what theology holds dear: redemption and grace. Where Luther for
instance held that one can only understand the seriousness of sin from within faith in (God’s) salvation, Heidegger argues for almost the contrary: the knowledge of sin will become the condition of possibility of something like faith and salvation as inauthenticity, later in Heidegger’s pathway, will be for ‘authentic’ being-there (p. 80).

Heidegger’s philosophy of finitude strips all metaphysical ‘extraneous postulates’ (p. 88). Here Wolfe advances what will be her central thesis: there remains in Heidegger through the concept of authenticity a ‘competing conception of salvation’ (p. 88) that is ‘genealogically dependent on Christian belief’ and makes Heidegger ‘hover uncomfortably between it and his professed a-theism’ (p. 89).

Yet it is the erasure of such ‘postulates’ that for Heidegger will lead to the ‘independence of phenomenology from religiosity’ (p. 92), differentiating between the ontic or empirical (which thrives on such postulates) and the ontological which supposedly can do without such postulates, like ontic ‘fear’ in Being and Time is fear for this or that object and angst, supposedly knows not of any object but is frightened by being-in-the-world per se, ‘as a whole’, or like ‘being unto death’ (which is not an object) pulls one out of the ontic preoccupations and fallenness ‘in’ the world. After Being and Time, this distinction will turn phenomenology against theology and culminate in Heidegger’s famous saying that anyone who thinks the Bible holds the answers cannot even properly ask the question of being.

Chapter Six, on Being and Time mainly, explores the different conceptions of sin (lack) and salvation (plenitude) between which Heidegger, for Wolfe, hovers. Almost despite himself, Heidegger resorts to Luther again. Wolfe writes: on the one hand, it is only from out of facing death that fallenness ‘comes into view’ (p. 125), on the other hand, Being and Time is ‘an affirmation of “sinfulness”’ (p. 127), in that it this authentic being-onto-death is nowise a permanent state hovering above fallen everydayness but, in a way, calls ‘towards’ (p. 131) it, as a recognition of sorts that there is no escape from the ‘guilt’ that comes with being-in-the-world.

There is a certain discrepancy in Wolfe’s book here, since she does not explain why Heidegger would in effect return formally to a theological axiom and would again understand, à la Luther, the lack from out the plenitude. As an aside, one might criticize Wolfe for having written a book of history rather than one of philosophy: it is good to know when and how Heidegger resorted to Protestantism but it might be even better to know why this Protestant stress on sin accords better with the Seinsgeschichte Heidegger narrates.

Nevertheless, it is with this formal return to a theological axiom that Wolfe’s own criticism of Heidegger emerges, for the desire of authenticity in Heidegger’s work seems indeed to presuppose that, deep within Dasein, there is a wish and a longing, if not knowledge, that all
this finitude simply is not and cannot be enough (pp. 132–3). There is in Heidegger an ‘unspoken assumption’ (p. 131) that Dasein will indeed strive for something more and other than everyday being-in-the-world and that, especially, our experience with our loved ones initiates ‘a desire that being should be infinite’, one ‘which is not easily dismissed as a mere misanalysis of our finitude’ (p. 134).

As Chapter Five before, the Conclusion again engages in Heidegger’s debate with dialectical theology (Barth, Brunner, Bultmann et al.) and Catholic theologians (e.g. Przywara). It is to be regretted that this conclusion (and this book) end a bit abruptly, by indicating Edith Stein’s dialogue with Heidegger. It is clear that one will have to wait for future work of Wolfe to have a fuller grasp of her theology and also for her views on the later Heidegger, but some intimations are noteworthy.

First, in a fine rehearsal of the interpretations of Bultmann and Kuhlmann, Wolfe notes, as many have done before here, Heidegger’s downplaying of the importance (for Dasein) of being-with, of community with others (pp. 145–8). In short, the desire to transcend (one’s Dasein) might first of all come to us through others. The desire for something more than sheer being might only arise out of communal experiences that makes us value (our) being in the first place. Although the objection is as old as Being and Time itself (cf. Löwith, Binswanger), it is especially worthy of note since Wolfe singles out, with Bultmann and later Stein, the experience of love (pp. 134, 155). With Stein, Wolfe agrees that in the phenomenon of anxiety Heidegger overlooks an essential point: whereas Heidegger argues that in death and angst, that for which and that of which one is anxious is essentially the same, namely one’s being-in-the-world, Stein states that one might in effect be anxious of one’s fragility or nullity within the world but that this angst is not angst for being-in-the-world but rather for no longer being able to share within the world a plenitude with others. Wolfe concludes with Stein that ‘Heidegger’s analyses [. . .] point beyond themselves to realities that exceed the grasp of phenomenology’ (p. 155) and sees in this a confirmation of sorts of Stein’s theological vantage-point.

Yet, and even if I have no worries not to concede to Heidegger the final word of phenomenology, it is not sure whether this leap to theology would here be validated. For, even from within phenomenology proper, Heidegger’s analyses can (and should) be invalidated. Stein’s analysis would in effect return (ontological) anxiety to (ontic) fear, where the ‘of which’ and ‘for which’ are essentially not the same: my fear is about snakes, but what I fear is my being no longer to be there because of a snake’s bite. What Stein (and Wolfe) are arguing for here is a falsification of Heidegger’s rather rigid distinction between the ontic and the ontological, between fear and anxiety. This can be granted. The further claim that the collapse of this distinction would immediately open onto ‘a participation in eternal being’ (at least for Stein) cannot be
granted. Let us imagine for an instant the phenomenon of sickness. What happens when one hears that because of this or that illness one has only a few years to live? Here (ontological) anxiety incarnates, as it were, in this very concrete and ontic figure of this sickness and becomes an ontic fear for precisely this malady: it is through this ontic fear for this sickness that one encounters anxiety, even in the sense of Stein as the loss of plenitude (to come). This example might show already that it is one thing to think about plenitude, it might be something entirely other to turn such a plenitude into the *plenum* of the theological tradition. Phenomenologically the question is: does one know the plenitude from out of the lack or the lack from out of the plenitude, rather? It is here that in Heidegger there might in effect be a ‘contrary longing’ (p. 5).

To conclude with a nod to Heidegger. Even if his stark opposition between ontic and ontological, between theology (and the postulates of faith) and philosophy might prove to be untenable and even if, today, there seems to be no need any more to differentiate radically between philosophy and theology – they should join forces rather – this does not, in itself, answer Heidegger’s ambition that his thought should in effect be a ‘confrontation’ (p. 92) with theology rather than a classic ancilla. For this, one might wonder if theology is yet up to the task of thinking; if in effect philosophy for Heidegger in a sense is the art of a radical questioning, why would we not consider whether theology, itself, can convert into such a radical questioning – and perhaps here too ‘the question is able to provide a hold’ (*Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, p. 241).

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