

maintain their possession of us). Perceiving a continuous interruption of history by the infinite 'objects' *within* time creates a space for us to breath anew, to refresh ourselves with the 'paradise character of space', that which we had been longing for all along and which the work of art seemed to hold before us for a fleeting instant. Seen as such, messianic time is perhaps not as removed from our world as we had suspected: it is pure 'plastic' time itself – the natural flow of time that humanity has often sought to contain (again, *possess*) through the imposition of the category of history itself. As might be suspected, this reading of historiographical operations contains the seeds for a vast re-examination of how we relate ourselves to history, traditions and ideology in general. It contains, that is, a radical liberatory potential that many object-oriented thoughts

have as of late been emphasizing and here find a deep affinity.

Though my review contains a general précis of the book, I admittedly have done little justice to the wealth of historical and textual analysis that Fenves has put forth in the volume, especially in relation to Kant, Heidegger and Scholem. In many ways, the overview of such a detailed context for Benjamin's earliest formulations is what gives this book its strength. For those interested in Benjamin's work, and for many who thought they were not, this book is a reading requirement I cannot recommend highly enough.

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Heidegger's Eschatology: Theological Horizons in Martin Heidegger's Early Work. By Judith Wolfe. Pp. xi, 181, Oxford University Press, 2013, £50.00.

In this expansion of her doctoral dissertation Wolfe establishes, on the basis of a thorough study of recently published material, the religious provenance of Heidegger's eventually atheistic phenomenological analysis of the eschatological structure of *Dasein* as 'fallen' into ontic dispersion but challenged or 'rescued' towards a possible conversion into authentic existence by an unavoidable orientation or anticipation, not towards God, but towards the unknowable Nothingness behind death, which thereby succeeds in providing an immanent replacement for the transcendent fulfillment *Dasein* had hitherto projected to still the questioning trajectory of its search, thereby to sink into the complacency of a less-than-authentic uncritical fulfillment. Heidegger had kept this religious origin of his eventual rigorously atheistic phenomenological program hidden and regularly re-interpreted himself and his early stages to keep them in line with dimensions assumed and results obtained later in his development; Wolfe provides an invaluable guide, produced by extensive and painstaking research, into the actual course he followed in coming to his eventual conception of philosophy's vocation to accept the unalterable eschatological 'shell' or 'skeleton' that *Dasein* first deploys in the Neo-Platonic, Scholastic, and Hegelian attempts to expand and convert itself towards fusion with a transcendent 'Other', but to sublimate or modify this structure, substituting this-worldly objects in an essentially immanent process, to produce an inversion or reversal of the former, a photographic negative in black and white to replace the previous 'positive' of a flamboyantly colourful other-worldly fulfillment, but strategically, sneakily or ironically attaining the same end of a 'divinization' of the self, as it lifts itself to the

highest level it can reach, achieves an end to denial and fantasy projection to quiet its (legitimate) anxieties, and presents a more honest, sober, stripped down, disciplined, defiant and diamond-hard form of human fulfillment that it challenges other contenders to reach or improve upon. From a courageous and embattled ultramontane Catholic position, Heidegger reasoned himself, through the young Luther and Kierkegaard, out of Christianity and religion altogether, towards an even more courageous and embattled position on the chilly heights where the method of doubt or rigorous suspicion that defines post-Cartesian Western philosophy is turned from sources of authority external to the self to internal structures the subject now suspects to be the true source of its error and low, weak level of existence. Armed with this diagnosis, it can then turn against itself, reverse or sublimate the now recognized tendencies of these structures in a new, self-designed 'conversion' that paradoxically achieves the same desired result of definitive uplift, 'salvation', or divinization, precisely by turning *against* this fulfillment in its initial literal, childish or fantasy self-presentation. We repair the shoddy craftsmanship of the initial demiurge by going back and doing the same thing better ourselves – the way we pull wisdom teeth that now serve no useful purpose – thereby achieving a superior result and edging out the current occupant as the true or superior divinity. We are on our way to Nietzsche, whom Heidegger will later engage. Wolfe here establishes herself as the cicerone who leads us accurately and reliably through this crucial early, and previously hidden, period in Heidegger's development.

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